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WILL QUANTS RULE THE (LEGAL) WORLD?
Edward K. Cheng*
SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO BE
SMART. By Ian Ayres. New York: Bantam Dell. 2007. Pp. 272. $25.
INTRODUCTION
The quants are coming! And they are here to stay-so argues Professor
Ian Ayres' in his new book, Super Crunchers, which details the brave new
world of statistical prediction and how it has already begun to affect our
lives. For years, academic researchers have known about the considerable
and at times surprising advantages of statistical models over the considered
judgments of experienced clinicians and experts. Today, these models are
emerging all over the landscape. Whether the field is wine, baseball, medicine, or consumer relations, they are vying against traditional experts for
control over how we make decisions.
To be sure, given its intended popular audience, Super Crunchers does
not push the envelope in the judgment and decision-making field, spending
most of its effort on summarizing and "translating" the recent successes in
statistics and econometrics for the lay reader. But in this endeavor, it succeeds. Those who ordinarily cringe at numbers will find the book a
delightful and educationally worthwhile read.
For the legal system, the take-home of Ayres's book and the examples he
describes is clear. Courts should be using more statistical decision rules, not
only because they promise greater accuracy, but also because they provide
the consistency and transparency to which the law often aspires. In line with
the Supreme Court's contemporary pronouncements on scientific evidence,'
courts should be skeptical of traditional experts who testify from personal
experience and intuition without quantified empirical data, and be more accepting of statistical evidence.
Although Ayres may have originally wanted to entitle his book The End
of Intuition (pp. 55-56), the reality may be far more complicated than this
suggests. A substantial recent literature has developed showing the superiority of intuitions and gut feelings, which the pro-statistics crowd has
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to Casey Kroma for research
assistance and to Adrienne Fowler for excellent editorial comments. Generous support was provided
by the Brooklyn Law School Dean's Summer Research Fund and the Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy.
I.

William K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School.

2. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) ("[Nlothing ... requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and
the opinion proffered.").
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effectively ignored. In addition, supercrunching raises deep issues about
profiling, individualized justice, and the nature of legal practice. Navigating
these tensions between intuition, statistics, and the law will be the key challenge for the future.

I.

BRAVE NEW WORLD

Super Crunchers begins with an entertaining introduction to statistical
modeling through a series of memorable examples. At the outset, we meet
Orley Ashenfelter, the Princeton professor whose regression model for
Bordeaux wine quality and prices sparked outrage among wine connoisseurs
over a decade ago (pp. 1-6). Although famed wine taster Robert Parker denounced Ashenfelter as "an absolute total sham" (p. 3), Ashenfelter's simple
regression model involving only rainfall and temperature data performs remarkably well in predicting wine quality-most importantly, his model
predicts better than the experts.3
Wine tasters are not the only traditional experts under siege. Baseball
fans will appreciate Ayres's reference to Michael Lewis's Moneyball.4 The
time-honored baseball scout, who spends countless hours watching prospects and assessing if they have "what it takes," now competes against the
statistical model. The highly publicized success of "sabermetrics" for the
Oakland A's and Boston Red Sox has made supercrunching a permanent
fixture in America's pastime (pp. 8-9).
Similarly, the clinical judgment of physicians is under increasing attack,
as seen in the trend toward evidence-based medicine (pp. 81-102). Doctors
unsurprisingly fall prey to the same mental biases that psychologists have
shown to afflict the rest of us: They are overly impressed by anecdotal evidence, even though such reasoning can lead to incorrect inferences based on
coincidence (p. 89). Once they formulate a theory or diagnosis, they are susceptible to tunnel vision, failing to consider alternatives and ignoring
contradictory evidence. Sometimes, the medical profession does not even
know why a particular procedure is performed a certain way-it is merely
how things have always been done.6 Those familiar with recent debates over
scientific evidence in forensics and toxic torts will undoubtedly recognize
the tune. 7

3.

Pp. 2-4 (citing Orley Ashenfelter et al., Bordeaux Wine Vintage Quality and the Weather,

CHANCE, Fall 1995, at 7).
4.

Pp. 7-9 (citing MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME

(2003)).
5.
Pp. 97-98; cf Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 291 (discussing tunnel vision in the criminal justice

system).
6.
See, e.g., JEROME GROOPMAN, How DOCTORS THINK 136-38 (2007) (discussing a procedure for draining fluid around the heart and its rather ad hoc development).
7.
See, e.g., Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699, 720-21 (1998) (discussing the problems of anecdotal evidence in toxic-tort cases); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J.
Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VANO. L. REv. 199, 209-10
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Statistical tools offer a path out of this mess. For example, computer decision-tools can help doctors' intuition by suggesting alternative diagnoses
(pp. 98-99). Digitalization and aggregation of medical records means more
data for epidemiological analyses, and the possibility of computer-based
decision-making is not far off, presuming that the medical establishment
allows it (pp. 99-100).
But the transformative potential of statistical models does not end at replacing traditional experts like wine connoisseurs, baseball scouts, and
medical doctors. Ayres shows that number crunching is changing social and
business interactions as well. Film companies use statistical tools to predict
blockbusters (pp. 144-49). Matchmaking, a task traditionally reserved to
friends and relatives, has become a sophisticated, statistically driven industry (pp. 23-28). Statistical models are even revolutionizing consumer
relations. Credit card companies can lower interest rates, airlines can dole
out flight perks, and casinos can swoop in with palliatives to keep their
"best" customers placated just enough (pp. 28-31, 47-50, 58-60). As Ayres
playfully suggests, in the future, when a seller starts giving you freebies,
watch out (pp. 172-73).
At approximately its midpoint, Super Crunchers turns to cover some
well-trodden ground in the decision-making literature that shows statistical
methods to be often more accurate than experts! One such study that Ayres
discusses (p. 111) is a comprehensive meta-analysis of the clinical-statistical
literature by psychologist William Grove and others, in which out "[o]f the
136 studies, 64 favored the actuary[,] .. . 64 showed approximately equivalent accuracy, and 8 favored the clinician." 9 Indeed, in some of these studies,
statistical models were superior despite the experts being privy to more information (statistical models generally require a shockingly small number of
factors)' ° and even more outrageously, despite experts having the model results at their disposal (pp. 116-17). Having a human override for catching
"stupid" machine errors turns out to be counterproductive, because the safety valve ends up introducing more errors than it prevents (pp. 121-23).

(2008) (discussing the lack of empirical foundation for the assumption that latent fingerprints are
unique).
8. Pp. 108-11. There are many comprehensive reviews of this literature, but a recent treatment that includes a nice discussion of the reasons for the success of statistical methods can be
found in MICHAEL A. BISHOP & J.D. TROUT, EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN
JUDGMENT 24-53 (2005).
9. William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective,
hnpressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The ClinicalStatistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 293, 298 (1996). Ayres attributes the metaanalysis to Grove and Meehl, but their article attributes the results to a study by Grove and others
(without Meehl). See William M. Grove et al., Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A MetaAnalysis, 12 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 19 (2000).
10. The RRASOR statistical prediction tool for future violence is a striking illustration of the
simplicity of statistical models. To predict future dangerousness, RRASOR considers four things:
number of prior sexual offenses, age of release, victim gender, and relationship to victim. P. 120
(citing JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

400 (6th ed. 2006)).
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Ayres also touches on the broader implications of statistical decision
making and suggests some reasons for society's resistance to statistical
methods. One reason is what Ayres entitles "The Status Squeeze" (p. 166).
By standardizing the decision-making process, statistical models "threaten[]
the status and respectability of many traditional jobs," particularly those of
professionals with expertise (p. 166). As Ayres recounts, loan officers traditionally held "moderately high status position[s,] ... were well paid and had
real power to decide who did and did not qualify for loans" (p. 166). Statistical models, however, have since gutted the loan officer position, making
them "nothing more than glorified secretaries" (p. 167). The loan officer tale
is in many ways an ominous one for doctors and other professionals watching statistical models erode away their discretion. Their prestige, autonomy,
and livelihood are at risk as the quants encroach on their territory.
Super Crunchers also briefly touches on a few other concerns about statistical methods: privacy, discrimination, and error. In terms of privacy,
supercrunching certainly makes it more difficult for people to escape their
pasts and futures, but as Ayres points out, much of the privacy concern has
more to do with "the dark side of digitalization" and the availability of personal information than with the use of statistical methods per se (p. 176). To
Ayres, the potential for discrimination is more troubling. For example, he
worries that statistical methods can be used pretextually to mask underlying
animus: "lenders can mine a database to find characteristics that strongly
correlate with race and use those characteristics as a pretext for loan denials" (pp. 174-75). Concerns about error are similarly problematic to him. As
the old saying goes, garbage in, garbage out; so if statistical models are riddled with errors or constructed by biased investigators, then they are
hazardous indeed (p. 185). To address these concerns, Ayres emphasizes the
importance of independent verification and open-access norms as the supercrunching world develops (p. 185).
II.

SOME UNEXPLORED IMPLICATIONS

Despite its considerable success in getting even the most serious number-phobe excited about the ascendant supercrunching world, the book
leaves several important areas underdeveloped. Perhaps a comprehensive
treatment was not Ayres's intent, but I think the issues are worth exploring.
At a minimum, Super Crunchers provides a useful launch pad for discussing
these deeper problems.
A. Superprofiling
The first issue is profiling. Statistical models are essentially a kind of
"superprofiling" and thus provoke the same concerns that accompany racial
and other forms of profiling. As previously mentioned, Super Crunchers
does raise the issue of statistical models being used as pretexts for discrimination, but to my mind, that barks up the wrong tree. Pretextual reasons are
always a problem, irrespective of the form of decision making used, and
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with statistical methods, there is at least data to test for hidden agendas.
Traditional expert judgments are a complete black box, making discrimination notoriously difficult to prove. The constitutional prohibition on racebased preemptory challenges, for example, has become a paper tiger as
courts have been hard-pressed to distinguish legitimate gut feelings from
pernicious ones."
In addition, to the extent that statistical methods create more accurate
and nuanced profiles, they reduce unjustified stereotyping. Although historical redlining practices were surely in part motivated by animus, they also
were arguably crude profiling mechanisms used by lenders to assess risk.
Better statistical models mean less temptation to fall back on race as a (bad)
proxy. Finally, statistical rules, being rule based and algorithmic, are more
transparent and carry far lower risks of discrimination than the gut reactions
of the average clerk. As Ayres acknowledges, "[riegression equations, unlike
flesh-and-blood loan officers, cannot harbor racial animus" (p. 174). What
would we rather have: an airline check-in person who has the arbitrary discretion to give the first-class upgrade to the attractive-looking (read: white,
young, and wealthy) customer, or the computer program that decides which
customer is actually more economically valuable to the company?
The more fundamental problem with profiling is statistical error. Even if
a model is perfectly well constructed, it will not be perfectly accurate. As
impressive as it is, even a model that is 80% accurate will still be wrong
20% of the time. Shouldn't we worry about that 20%? For the statistically
inclined, this concern may appear downright silly: since decision making
always involves error, improving accuracy by switching from individualized, off-the-cuff decisions to statistical ones is a no-brainer. But the
concern is both real and important, because errors caused by a statistical
model's overgeneralizations often feel different from erroneous individualized determinations. For example, assume, as Michael Risinger's recent
study suggests, that our individualized criminal justice system has an average wrongful-conviction rate of 3 to 5%." While obviously a cause for
concern, that rate does not provoke nearly the level of outrage that would
ensue if we used a statistical model that knowingly imprisoned three innocents out of every hundred trials.
To my mind, however, Fred Schauer quite convincingly puts the issue of
overgeneralizations to rest in his book Profiles, Probabilities,and Stereotypes, 3 in which he argues that particularization is essentially a myth.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1454-55 (9th Cir. 1993) (permitting
peremptory challenges to three potential jurors with Hawaiian surnames for race-neutral reasons
such as lack of attentiveness, financial hardship, and having long hair and a beard); Pamela S.
Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2021 &
nn.96-101 (1998) (reporting explanations for excluding potential jurors such as weight, handwriting, clothing, and attitude).
D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful
12.
Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 762 (2007) (defending a 3 to 5% wrongful

conviction rate).
13.

FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES

(2003).
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Inference fundamentally requires generalization and thus profiling and its
resulting statistical errors are unavoidable, regardless of whether an expert
or a statistical model makes the decision. 4 A more legitimate concern arises
when statistical models cause innocent members of certain groups to be
consistently and disproportionately burdened, rather than spreading these
costs among all members of society more evenly.15 For example, errors in
the way Florida matched registered voters to convicted felons (who are not
allowed to vote1 6) disproportionately affected African American voters in the
2000 election, causing considerable consternation (pp. 137-38).
B. Two Ships Passing in the Night

A second issue relates to whether statistical modeling leads to optimal
decision making in only some contexts and, if so, when. In reading the book,
one gets the impression that the coming age of statistical modeling is inevitable: given their overwhelming accuracy, statistical models will ultimately
displace most, if not all, traditional clinical judgment and expert intuition. In
the future, intuition will be relegated primarily to model design (pp. 195200), and any reluctance to embrace statistical methods for day-to-day decision making is hopelessly nostalgic and indefensible.
But the future is not as straightforward as the one Super Crunchers
paints. Even putting aside the various social and ethical concerns of statistical thinking outlined above, whether statistical models are in fact universally
superior to human expertise is not at all clear. Indeed, even a casual reader
of the decision-making literature might sense that something is amiss. While
Ayres and other quants have heralded the coming of a statistical age, other
commentators have breathed new life into intuitive judgment. For example,
Malcolm Gladwell's bestseller Blink 7 and psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer's
recent book Gut Feelings" have revisited and popularized the power of intuition. And these works only scratch the surface of an increasing literature
on intuitive and expert thinking, which notably includes a potentially devastating critique from philosophers Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus that is two
decades old.' 9 The Dreyfuses claim that the rule-based approach to judgment
used by early artificial-intelligence researchers-strikingly similar to that
seen in many statistical models-faces an uphill battle when trying to sur-

14.

See, e.g., id. at 55-78 (dangerous dogs); id. at 160-67 (tax audits); id. at 299-300 (gen-

erally).
15.

Schauer uses the example of young Middle Eastern men at the airport. Id. at 181-90.

16. A recent constitutional challenge to Florida's felon-disenfranchisement statute was ultimately rebuffed by an en banc Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Johnson v. Governor of
Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11 th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
17.

MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING

(2005).

18.

GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

(2007).

19.

HUBERT L. DREYFUS & STUART E. DREYFUS, MIND OVER MACHINE: THE POWER OF
HUMAN INTUITION AND EXPERTISE IN THE ERA OF THE COMPUTER (1986).
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pass the intuitive judgment of seasoned experts. ° For the most part, this thesis has held true since it was published. As we all know, computers are very
good at certain tasks but remain simply pathetic at others.
In an ironic twist, Super Crunchers's subtitle, "Why Thinking-ByNumbers Is the New Way to Be Smart," actually embodies this complication. The allusion, of course, is to "painting-by-numbers," which connotes
mechanical, wooden, or even phony artistry. Ayres's point is that number
crunching, although seemingly uninspired, is in fact an enlightened path.
However, his clever word play invites a more ambivalent interpretation.
Painting-by-numbers is an efficient but suboptimal substitute. It allows those
with little artistic talent to reliably produce something with a modicum of
aesthetic value. The trade-off, however, is that the method never produces
anything approaching the results of true artistic talent developed through a
lifetime of experience and refinement.
Thinking-by-numbers may be a direct analog, with statistical models being a poor man's expert. Along these lines, statistical models are simplistic
substitutes that enable unskilled persons to make reasonably good decisions.
They may even beat people with some training and experience, but they
never capture the nuanced and insightful thought processes of those with
true mastery. 2 Take driving a car for instance: if you drive using a set of
discrete rules-in other words, if you think too much-you will drive like a
student driver, or more likely, crash."
Perhaps some day, statistical models will indeed rule the world. While
we all might like to think that human beings are special, I for one see little
reason why models cannot ultimately match, if not best, our cognitive processes. But the fact remains that right now, statistical superiority has not been
proven universally. Indeed, in the half century since Paul Meehl first identified this tension between clinical and statistical judgment, 23 the quants and
intuitivists have been like two ships passing in the night. The quants yell and
scream that statistical decision rules are superior to clinical judgment, deplore the glacial pace of reform, and accuse experts of obstructionism. 24 The
intuitivists in contrast argue that experience-based decision-making and human intuition are surprisingly powerful, so we should not too quickly buy

20.

See id. at 52-66.

21.

See id. at 63-66 (discussing problems that a rule-based model faces when replicating true

expertise); see also

SHOSHANA ZUBOFF,

IN THE AGE OF THE SMART MACHINE 61 (1988)

("There

are operators who know exactly what to do, but they cannot tell you how they do it." (quoting an
engineer discussing plant operations)).

22.

See

DREYFUS

&

DREYFUS,

supra note 19, at 19-36 (using driving as an example in their

taxonomy of skill acquisition).
23.

PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954).

24.

See, e.g., ROBYN M. DAWES, HOUSE

OF CARDS:

PSYCHOLOGY AND

PSYCHOTHERAPY

BUILT ON MYTH (1994) (criticizing the spread of psychotherapy treatments based purely on clinical
experience rather than backed by statistical data).

974
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into deliberative models of rationality (and by extension, statistical models)."
The challenge is to move past the compelling anecdotes and namecalling and determine more systematically when intuitive or clinical judg-

ments are better than statistical decision rules, and vice versa. Surely there
must be some useful guidelines. For example, since models generally require large amounts of data to operate reliably, perhaps we should demand

them only when dealing with relatively stable phenomena involving large
populations and repeated events. But then again, defining "repeated" or

"stable" may be tricky, particularly since experts tend to find too many ex26

ceptional cases. Knowledge about whether statistical models outperform
only the average expert, or whether they indeed outperform even the best
ones could also lead to useful direction. If it is only the average expert, then
statistical methods should only be viewed as efficient proxies, and we

should prefer models over experts for everyday expertise, but not for situations in which we can count on the best experts being available. For
example, in the legal context, courts would prefer models over experts in

run-of-the-mill cases, but not in mass torts, where the parties would invariably procure the world's best.
All- of this, of course, is only speculation, but this sort of research is
what the legal system desperately needs. Such general guidance would al-

most certainly have a significant influence on how judges think about
scientific evidence, particularly in an age of Daubert scrutiny.21 Courts could
of course demand specific comparisons between experts and models in each

specific context, but that would be prohibitively expensive and rather limited
in terms of flexibility. Courts have no time or resources to seek additional
research, and so an overall theory of when to employ statistical models

would be invaluable.
C. Ruling the Legal World
A final extension of Super Crunchers is to go beyond the battles over
expert testimony and to explore the likely influence of statistical modeling
25. Concededly, commentators frequently juxtapose intuition with more deliberative methods of decision making, but the comparisons are generally with human deliberation, not statistical
models. E.g., GIGERENZER, supra note 18, at 16-19; GLADWELL, supra note 17, at 11-17; Daniel
Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: A Perspective on Intuitive Judgment and Choice, in THE
NOBEL PRIZES

2002, at 449, 450-52 (Tore Frdingsmyr ed., 2003).

26. Pp. 121-22; see, e.g., Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243
Sci. 1668, 1670-71 (1989) (discussing studies suggesting that when experts deviate from actuarial
conclusions because of alleged special cases, they often create more errors than they correct). The
issue of exceptional cases was famously coined by Paul Meehl as the "broken leg problem" after the
following hypothetical: suppose there is a statistical model for predicting whether a professor will
go to the movies, but on this particular day, we know that the professor broke his leg. Presumably
we would want to use this special information rather than trust the model. MEEHL, supra note 23, at
24-25.
27. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that trial judges
must evaluate proffered expert witnesses to determine whether their testimony is both "relevant" and
"reliable," a two-pronged test of admissibility).
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on the legal world more generally. To be sure, Ayres mentions some lawrelated uses of statistics, such as detecting bid rigging for public contracts
(pp. 42-45), understanding the effects of longer prison sentences (pp. 7072), predicting future violence (pp. 118-21), and detecting discrimination
(pp. 130-33), but Super Crunchers does not paint the broader picture of how
statistics might fundamentally alter legal practice or legal decision-making.
This omission is particularly unfortunate, as Ayres almost certainly has interesting insights to share on this score, and I would have loved to see them.
Perhaps Ayres's self-characterization as a "gearhead" (p. 220) explains his
desire to focus more on the models and less on law, but since we are all
lawyers here, I think it appropriate to explore the significant and wideranging ramifications that statistical modeling will likely have on the law.
A core aspect of modem legal practice is prediction, as the venerable
Justice Holmes presaged in The Path of the Law." Lawyers use their experience along with traditional methods of legal analysis such as logic, analogy,
and statutory interpretation to predict case outcomes for their clients.29 But
as Super Crunchers suggests, statistical models often turn out to be better
crystal balls than traditional experts. If that superiority holds true in the legal
sphere, might we be witnessing the death of the traditional lawyer, or at a
minimum the beginnings of a sea change in legal practice?
Few attempts to statistically model legal decision making have yet made
it into popular consciousness, but the early returns are impressive for the
quants. For example, Ayres mentions the Supreme Court Forecasting Project, in which researchers pitted a statistical model of Supreme Court
decision-making against a set of constitutional law luminaries.3" In the study,
the statistical model was able to predict cases in the 2002 term with 75%
accuracy, trouncing the assembled experts and their paltry 59.1%.3" More
recently, Albert Yoon and I developed a model for the constitutionality of
punitive damage awards in reported cases, achieving an average accuracy
rate of 75%.12 We do not have the intriguing expert comparison found in
Supreme Court Forecasting Project, but one wonders if practitioners attain
that level of prediction (and if so, why those cases are still litigated).
If statistical models of court decisions are more accurate than practitioners, then legal practice may be on the brink of a revolution. Rather than use
their intuitive sense as to whether a case is a "good case" or not, attorneys
should instead code their client's facts and ask a well-validated statistical
model instead. And if attorneys are too technophobic or conservative to
28. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991,
991 (1997) ("The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.").
29.

Id. at 998.

30. Pp. 104-08; Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court ForecastingProject: Legal
and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1150 (2004).
31.

Ruger et al., supra note 30, at 1171.

32. Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Foretelling the Future in Punitive Damages Cases:
A Statistical Approach (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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make the leap, then their clients should demand it-after all, they are the
ones who ultimately pay the bills.
Will the statistical world of law thus reduce attorneys to mere legal
technicians who service the models? Decidedly not. The practice of law
involves far more than predicting case outcomes. It involves advice, strategy,
and persuasion; and while future statistical models may help lawyers do all
of those things, clients will still need competent advocates who actually
execute legal maneuvers in court. For this reason, I suspect that the legal
world will ultimately embrace these statistical tools. Attorneys may be a
risk-averse, conservative bunch, but there is no fundamental reason for them
to fear supercrunching. Unlike loan officers, baseball scouts, and wine connoisseurs, lawyers will remain important in a statistical world because a
good attorney can still move the odds in her client's favor. As such, if a
company called "QuantLaw" starts offering statistical analyses of court decisions for attorneys, I will be the first person in line at the IPO.
Beyond legal practitioners, we can even take the statistical legal world to
its radical conclusion and challenge the traditional roles of both judge and
jury. Legal decision-making is ultimately just another form of decisionmaking, and thus the question arises whether statistical models will place
pressure on these institutions as well.
Judicial rulings on questions of law are probably safe. These legal questions often involve value judgments, which (at least for now) are not within
the ken of statistical models. One would have to develop quite a cramped
view of lower court legal decision-making-for instance, that trial court
decisions are mere predictions of appellate decisions-in order to justify
displacing trial judges with statistical models.
Other judicial tasks are less secure. For example, sentencing lends itself
more readily to statistical modeling, especially if uniformity is the primary
goal. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, although now defanged, were in
many ways a quasi-statistical foray into the judicial role. Predictions of future dangerousness at sentencing are another opportunity. For years,
psychologists have shown that actuarial models of future dangerousness are
superior to the predictions of clinicians.33 As Ayres notes, some states, notably Virginia, have begun to incorporate these statistical prediction tools into
their commitment regimes (pp. 119-20). It will be interesting to see how
many other jurisdictions do the same.
The jury faces a more formidable challenge, at least conceptually. Jury
bashing is of course something of a sport in legal circles, though psycholo-3
4
gists have increasingly shown much of the bashing to be unfair.
Historically, the problem with maligning juries is that their alternativesjudges-are not necessarily better at achieving factual accuracy. Judges suf-

33. John Monahan, Predictions of Violence: Scientific Status, in 2 DAVID FAIGMAN ET AL.,
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 10:13, at 137-41 (2007) (comparing clinical and actuarial methods of violence prediction).
34. See generally NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN
(comprehensively reviewing the literature on jury decision making).

JURIES: THE VERDICT

(2007)
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fer many of the same cognitive limitations that affect jurors,35 and they lack
the diversity and strength-in-numbers found with juries. Consequently, it is
not at all clear why we should prefer a single judge over a panel of lay jurors, particularly for fact finding. Statistical models, however, threaten to
disrupt this standoff. No one has yet developed a statistical model for replacing the jury, but in principle, if statistical models can help us predict
dangerousness, diagnose disease, and pick baseball players, why can they
not help us assess who committed a murder or whether someone cheated on
their taxes?
Unsurprisingly, the mere idea that statistical methods might supplement
legal decision making generates unending and at times bitter controversy
about what exactly the legal system stands for. The suggestion of using
Bayesian evidentiary models several decades ago sparked a war in the evidence field that still rages today,3 6 and as previously mentioned, the practice
of profiling (even putting aside the race issue) leads to serious debates about
the notion of justice.37 Perhaps something about justice demands an individualized determination-we are deeply uncomfortable with targeting
people or sending them to prison based on a probabilistic guess, and a guess
38
is all statistical models can provide. Yet, at the end of the day, consider this
question: If you were on trial, would you rather have your fate decided by
an 85 percent accurate statistical model or an 80 percent accurate jury?
None of this is to say that Americans will ever come around to amending
the Constitution to implement this kind of statistically based adjudication
system, but it certainly makes us think about whether our current system is
worthwhile. As Ron Allen noted at a recent lecture, factual accuracy is not
only critical for a "coherent study of evidence, [it is also] ... the foundation
upon which western civilization rests."39 While it may be in vogue these
days to focus on procedures, rights, and (depending on who you are) traditions, they do not mean very much without factual accuracy.4 It is hard to
feel warm and fuzzy about rights and procedures when you are rotting in
jail.

35. See, e.g., Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible hiformation? The
Difficulty of DeliberatelyDisregarding,153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1251-52 (2005).
36. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical
Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2007); Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A
Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970); Charles Nesson, The
Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proofand the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357
(1985); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
37. See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 1-6 (2007); SCHAUER, supra note 13, at 299-300.
38.

See Nesson, supra note 36, at 1362, 1378-85.

39. Ronald J. Allen, From the Enlightenment to Crawford to Holmes, Lecture at the American Association of Law Schools Evidence Conference (June 6. 2008) (transcript on file with author).
40.

See id.
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CONCLUSION

For now, statistical modeling remains esoteric and inaccessible, a technical realm for pointy-heads. But like so many other initially intimidating
technologies-computers, MP3 players, and the internet-I suspect that
supercrunching will mature into a user-friendly and accepted part of our
daily lives. To gain this widespread acceptance, however, statistical methods
will need creative thinkers to popularize the core ideas. In this regard, Ayres
performs a remarkably valuable public service. The book raises far more
questions than it answers, but that is precisely what such a teaser should do.

